This blog is based on remarks delivered by Anna Nadibaidze at the event “Canada and the Middle Power Challenge” organised by the Canadian Pugwash Group (CPG) and the Centre for International Policy Studies (CIPS) in Ottawa on 2nd October 2026. Anna spoke at the panel “Military Applications of AI – Can the Juggernaut be Controlled?”, together with Dr. Branka Marijan (Project Ploughshares) and Sam Vaez (Canadian Pugwash Group).
In response to the panel’s guiding question (“Can the Juggernaut be Controlled?”), Anna Nadibaidze stated that there is a possibility of restricting and limiting how AI technologies are developed and used in the military domain. But she argued that the focus of those efforts should not be on the technological side, e.g. in terms of banning certain types of weapon systems or restricting the use of particular AI models. This is partly because by the time any potential treaty or any sort of other regulation might be adopted, we might already be talking about different types of technologies. It is common for legislation or regulation to be several years behind technological developments.
Instead, it may be worth shifting the debate towards what should be the role of the humans interacting with AI technologies across the AI lifecycle, and more specifically, how to safeguard an appropriate level of human judgement in decisions that are made using AI. That is, not when AI systems replace humans as in a ‘killer-robot’ sci-fi type of scenario, but when humans remain formally in control of the process while the quality of human judgement risks being affected by the use of AI technologies.
Why this question is timely
First, we already see studies emerging on the impact of using generative AI and large-language models on human cognitive skills, which raises concerns about human-machine interaction and the role of the human in that interaction. Here, the question becomes whether there is sufficient opportunity to exercise human agency (the capacity to act) when making military decisions on targeting with the use of AI?
Second, empirical trends from around the world in terms of the development and use of AI in the military domain demonstrate an interest in using AI systems to support humans, rather than necessarily replacing humans in a fully autonomous ‘killer robot’ type of application. Prominent cases include the Israeli Defense Forces’ (IDF) use of AI-based decision-support systems (AI DSS) in Gaza, as well as the US military’s use of the Maven Smart System in its war on Iran. There have also been reports of the US military employing Claude to plan the abduction of Nicolas Maduro, with President Trump reportedly using xAI’s Grok model to ask questions about how the Venezuelan people would react to such an abduction.
A recent CNN report further highlighted the relevance of this question. It mentioned that the US military almost boarded a Chinese vessel by trusting intelligence that claimed that the Chinese ship had nuclear weapons on board. However, this intelligence report was generated (or ‘hallucinated’) by an AI system. Therefore, a military confrontation between two major powers almost started not only due to AI itself, but also because of how military personnel and decision-makers interacted with AI outputs. This case illustrates how maintaining an appropriate level of human judgement in such crucial decisions is really what matters here. As prominent scientists Timnit Gebru and Emily Bender argue in a recent op-ed, it is not superintelligence we should be concerned about, but existing uses of AI and what they mean for the human.
Challenges of operationalising the role of the human
Safeguarding the role of the human is something that global governance debates recognize. In one way or another, the role of the human is present in all Responsible AI initiatives in the military domain: whether it is referred to as meaningful human control, human judgement, or another term.
As an example, the most recent Responsible AI in the Military Domain (REAIM) Summit’s outcome document, the REAIM Pathways to Action, notes that “AI-enabled decision support systems should support, not replace, the exercise of human judgement”.
But while governance debates note the importance of this human role, the challenge is to implement it into practice. Ironically enough, the REAIM Pathways to Action did not really provide concrete pathways, and the discussion remains around general principles. This suggests that there are several challenges to the operationalization of these principles.
First, there is a lack of support from major military AI developers. Many of them have been consistently against new regulation in this sphere, such as Russia, Israel, India and the US. The latter has even further intensified its position under the second Donald Trump administration, now promoting the full-on integration of AI and autonomy, as demonstrated in Pete Hegseth’s recent Autonomous Warfare Command. Additionally, these states seem to continue to interfere in diplomatic processes. The Washington Post reported that during recent negotiations on autonomous weapons in Geneva, when Group of Governmental Experts on LAWS was drafting its final report, the US and Russia deployed their resourceful delegations to substantially change the report’s text. For instance, they removed “a provision requiring that humans review military targets developed by AI before a strike”. With a vacuum from so-called great powers, the question then becomes: can middle powers rise to the challenge and lead on military AI governance?
A second challenge is that different strategic environments are interpreted differently. For many actors, there is a concern that imposing too many restrictions on ensuring the human role risks preventing innovation. This concern is guided by the idea that regulation automatically prevents innovation. At the same time, many states and middle powers such as Canada, the United Kingdom, or Australia, are pursuing AI adoption because they consider it a priority to deal with the strategic situation in their respective regions.
However, middle powers may have a unique opportunity to develop defence technological capabilities while securing a high quality of agency for humans and not falling into the false innovation vs. regulation narrative. In fact, guidelines on the role of the human may strengthen innovation and secure adoption of AI.
Finally, there are different resources available for actors who seek to implement Responsible AI principles. At the Center for War Studies, we conducted the AutoPractices project, bringing together stakeholders from all over the world to co-create a practical toolkit with best practices to strengthen the exercise of human agency across the AI lifecycle. Some examples of these practices include: conducting extensive risk assessment frameworks, paying attention to defence procurement and not being too reliant on vendors, and conducting continuous training and education of humans (not only military personnel, but all humans involved across the AI lifecycle). One of the issues that constantly came up in the discussion is that many of these practices require financial, technical, and human resources that most states do not have. To address this challenge, there is much potential for middle powers to play a key role on capacity building and sharing of best practices.